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Ohio's Voluntary Action Program: Solving Ohio's
Toxic Waste Woes?
BRIAN THOMAS LANG*
After many years offailed federal environmental remediation programs,
many states have enacted their own remediation legislation aimed at
encouraging the redevelopment ofpolluted land. Ohio is among these states and
has enacted its own statutory program that encourages voluntary participation
by landowners and developers. Some commentators have viewed Ohio's
innovative program as having great potential for success. However, in the
pursuit of environmental remediation, the Ohio General Assembly should not be
content to rest on its laurels. Many important lessons can be learned from a
close look at what other states have accomplished with their own legislation.
I. INTRODUCTION
For years, the twenty-three-acre "Old Pen" site in downtown Columbus,
Ohio sat idle and slowly deteriorated into an eyesore. In 1995, when no else
wanted the site, the city of Columbus acquired it for one dollar from the state of
Ohio.' Tests revealed that more than a century of industry employing inmate
labor left behind chlorinated solvents, heavy metals, and lead.2 Tunnels under the
site contained pipes wrapped in asbestos Despite these problems, Columbus saw
promise. With the help of Ohio's newly enacted voluntary toxic substance
cleanup program came hope that the enormous site in the heart of downtown
could be brought back to life. Today, that site is part of the future home of the
$125 million Nationwide Arena and the National Hockey League's expansion
team, the Columbus Blue Jackets.4 The arena and team are expected to
* I would like to thank Michelle LeVeque, David Patton, David Torborg, and Paul Wolfla
for their invaluable assistance throughout the various stages of this Note. I would also like to
thank Vincent Atriano. Finally, I would like to thank Amanda Lang for her support throughout.
1 See John Futty, Pen Site Loaded with Chemicals City's Cost to Clean Up Mess May be
in the Millions, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 15, 1997, at Al.
2 See id Such chemicals are expected to be found beneath an industrial site that has been
in operation for over one-hundred years.
3 See id
4 See Doug Caruso, Parking Lot OK'dfor Old Pen Site, COLUMBus DISPATCH, Mar. 4,
1998, at Cl. Recently, the city of Columbus, Ohio agreed to sell 13.5 acres of the "Old Pen"
site to Nationwide for $11.7 million. Columbus has already spent $7.4 million in cleanup and
the agreement with Nationwide stated that the city would spend up to $2 million more in
environmental remediation. The extra $2 million may be necessary to effectuate cleanup
required to residential levels. Nationwide's revised Arena District plan locates upscale
residential housing on the 13.5 acres. See Jim Woods, City May Pay up to $2 Million More for
Pen Changes, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 17, 1998, at Al.
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reinvigorate development of the whole Scioto riverbank.5 In all likelihood,
without the new voluntary cleanup program, the site would have remained in a
polluted state indefinitely. This is only one demonstration of the usefulness of
Ohio's new environmental program at work.6 The state's voluntary cleanup
program has shown more promise in encouraging redevelopment over the past
three years than federal programs have demonstrated in the past eighteen years.7
When compared to the federal government, states are naturally in a better
position to evaluate their unique environmental situations and to encourage
cleanup of toxic substances within their borders.8 Furthermore, states may be
more willing than the federal government to supply necessary funds or offer
incentives in order to facilitate cleanup.9 States are especially motivated because
empty brownfields do not contribute to the tax base of the states' communities.10
Despite the potential role of the individual states, the federal government has
largely monopolized toxic substance cleanup for the past eighteen years. The
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA),11 the very statute aimed at remediating America's toxic waste woes,
5 Cleanup will not be cheap. In fact, cleanup has already cost over $7.4 million. See
Woods, supra note 4, at Al. However, estimated economic benefits are high. See John Futty,
Old Pen Site Cleanup Put Out for Bids, COLUMBUS DIsPATCH, May 9, 1997, at Cl.
6 For other examples, see OHIO VOLUNTARY ACION PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT (1997)
<http://www.epa.ohio.gov/derr/vap/legreport> [hereinafter REPORT].
7 For a complete discussion of these issues, see infra notes 31-45, 118 and accompanying
text.
8 See Andrea Lee Rimer, Environmental Liability and the Brownfields Phenomenon: An
Analysis of Federal Options for Redevelopment, 10 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 63, 106 (1996)
(evaluating the efficacy of a federal voluntary program). Rimer explains:
First, states are in the best position to evaluate their own needs and
limitations .... The social, geographic, economic, and other differences across our country
would not all be served by one uniform program. Individual state programs allow
consideration of these different circumstances, and lead to experimentation to achieve the
right balance of requirements and incentives.
Id.
9 See id. at 106 ("[S]tates may be more willing than the federal government to make
economic tradeoffs or accept more of the burdens of cleanup themselves, rather than forcing all
of the costs on private parties.").
10 For example, mayors of thirty-three cities estimated lost tax revenues of $131 million
due to undeveloped brownfields. See TODD S. DAVIS & KEVIN D. MARGOLIS, Defining the
Brownfields Problem, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GuirE TO REDEVELOPING
CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 3, 6 (Todd S. Davis et a]. eds., 1997) [hereinafter BROWNFIELDS].
Without programs designed to reinvigorate brownfields in inner cities, industry will continue to
move to greenfields-pristine land surrounding suburbs-and localities will continue to lose
valuable property taxes critical to educate children and maintain infrastructures.
11 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994) (creating environmental enforcement mechanisms,
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is now, ironically, viewed by many as substantially contributing to the problems it
was intended to cure.12
No longer content to play a passive role, states have begun to reclaim the lead
in toxic substance cleanup by instituting voluntary action programs (VAPs).13
Generally, state VAPs are designed to encourage the redevelopment of
brownfields 14 by providing either clear guidelines for remediation15 or a
predictable, efficient system to guide cleanup along with some form of liability
protection for owners, potential purchasers, and lenders.16
the "Superfund," and establishing a liability scheme).
12 One author comments:
One major factor contributing to the brownfields phenomenon has been the slow
pace of Superftmd cleanups. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the EPA and
liable parties have completed cleanups at only 149 of the 1275 National Priorities List
(NPL) sites at an average cost of about thirty million dollars each. Furthermore, the
average federal cleanup takes nearly twelve years to complete.
Rimer, supra note 8, at 101 (footnote omitted); see also John A Chiappinelli, Comment, The
Right to a Clean and Safe Environment: A Case for A Constitutional Amendment Recognizing
Public Rights in Common Resources, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 567, 588-89 (1992) (explaining the
high degree of fiustration that exists among members of Congress regarding the slow pace of
environmental agencies in protecting the environment).
13 By January of 1998, thirty states had enacted statutes regarding remediation of
contaminated property that involved "voluntary action" by an owner or operator, prospective
purchaser, or municipality as an element These state statutes differ dramatically in terms of
design and effectiveness; however, these differences could simply be the result of state
legislatures addressing the unique needs of developers in their respective states or geographic or
other regional differences. Further, the state VAPs are such a recent phenomenon that their
evolution is far from over. See generally BROWNFIELDS, supra note 10, at 287-681 (describing
the statutory remediation scheme in Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
14 Region 5 of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) has defined
a "brownfield" as "abandoned, idled or underused industrial and commercial sites where
expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental contamination
that can add cost, time and uncertainty to a redevelopment project" USEPA REGION 5 OFFICE
OF PUB. AFFAIRS, BAsIC BROWNFmIsS FACr SHEET (1996), reprinted in BROWNFIELDS, supra
note 10, at 5. Brownfields are typically located in urban areas that were once heavily
industrialized. Their size may vary from less than an acre to hundreds of acres. See id
157The Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) defines '"remedial action' as
"[a]ctions taken at a property to treat, remove, transport for treatment or disposal, dispose of,
contain, control, or control hazardous substances or petroleum, which are protective of the
public health and safety and the environment and are consistent with a permanent remedy... 
REPORT, supra note 6.
16 See generally BROWNFIELDS, supra note 10, at 287-681.
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Ohio's VAP 17 has been widely regarded as one of the most innovative and
comprehensive VAPs to date.18 Ohio's VAP offers an array of benefits including.
(1) uniform standards for cleanup that take into account actual human exposure,
current and proposed uses of property, and uses of surrounding property;19 (2)
extensive delegation of cleanup responsibility to certified professionals;20 (3)
special variance provisions;21 (4) voluntary entrance into the program; 22 (5)
covenants not to sue;23 (6) consolidated standards permits;24 (7) immunities from
liability;25 and (8) extensive confidentiality provisions. 6
Additionally, Ohio's VAP should completely pay for itself in the near
future.27 Ohio's VAP is designed to reinvigorate brownfields and protect the
health and safety of the public while costing taxpayers absolutely nothing.2
17 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3746.01-3746.99 (West 1998). The corresponding
administrative rules are located in OHIO ADMINISTRATIVE CODE §§ 3745-300-01 to 3745-300-
99 (1996-1997). OEPA administrators have targeted 1,200 sites statewide that they hope will
ultimately participate in the program. See Randall Edwards, Governor Lauds State's Industrial
Cleanup Program, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 16,1997, at CA.
18 See BROWNFiBLDS, supra note 10, at 552 ("Ohio's Voluntary Action Program has been
considered one of the most progressive and complete state voluntary cleanup programs."); R.
Michael Sweeney, Brownfields Restoration and Voluntary Cleanup Legislation, 2 ENVTh. L.
101, 124 (1995) (suggesting that Ohio's VAP should serve as a model for states considering
enacting voluntary remediation statutes). Note, not all authors express such a positive view of
Ohio's VAP. See Elizabeth Glass Geltman, A COMPLEIE GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL AUDrrS
484 (1997) ("Compliance with Ohio['s] [VAP] has been criticized as an overwhelming and
burdensome task."). Features of other states' statutes enacted since Ohio's VAP do contain
provisions similar to Ohio's, however, a careful evaluation of the differences in those states'
statutes should serve as a starting point for reevaluation of Ohio's program See infira notes
119-79 and accompanying text.
19 See OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 3746.07(A)(2) (West 1998).
20 See id. § 3746.071.
21 See id § 3746.09.
22 See id § 3746.10.
23 See id § 3746.12.
24 See id § 3746.15.
25 See id § 3746.24 (regarding immunity of officers and employees, contractors working
in connection with a voluntary cleanup, and state agencies and political subdivisions); see also
id § 374626 (regarding secured party liability).
26 See id. § 3746.28.
27 See REPORT, supra note 6 (stating that the goal of the program is to function entirely
free from program fees). Fifty-five percent of revenues are generated by certified professional
fees, thirty-one percent are generated by certified laboratory fees, eleven percent are generated
by no further action letter fees, and three percent come from other sources. See id.
28 In order to start Ohio's VAP program, the OEPA borrowed $2,803,274 from the
Hazardous Waste Facility Management Account The OEPA reports that revenues have been
increasing steadily since the promulgation of the program rules in the middle of 1997. In 1995,
revenues were $146,125.50, and expenses were $387,842.06. In 1996, revenues were
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Despite the advantages of Ohio's VAP, some critics remain opposed to state
regulation of cleanup of toxic substances. 29 Indeed, there remains room for
improvement even in Ohio's model program. However, critics should not lose
sight of the fact that states necessarily have the advantage when it comes to
understanding their unique position and realizing the best methods of encouraging
brownfields redevelopment.
In addition to evaluating the structure of Ohio's VAP, this Note analyzes how
Ohio's VAP could be made more effective by evaluating innovative aspects of
other states' VAPs. Part I1.A briefly addresses CERCLA and other federal efforts
to regulate and facilitate cleanup of toxic substances. Part ll.B outlines the major
provisions of Ohio's VAP and includes references to the recently promulgated
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) rules.
Part III focuses on the innovative aspects of other states' VAPs and how
other states' programs could benefit the evolution of Ohio's VAP. These
recommendations include added liability protection, a more liberal statute of
limitations, and new financial incentives to facilitate cleanup. This Note also
suggests that because Ohio's VAP is largely "privatized," potential conflicts of
interest problems must be closely monitored. Finally, consideration should be
given to involving the public more completely in the VAP process. The analysis
assumes that Ohio's VAP is a dynamic statute-constantly evolving and
responding to changing circumstances and changing needs of the remediating
community.30
I. TOXIc SUBSTANCE CLEANUP PROGRAMS
Long before Ohio's VAP, there was CERCLA. If CERCLA had been more
effective or if Congress or the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(USEPA) had responded to CERCLA's deficiencies sooner, there may have
never been a need for state VAPs. However, Congress has done virtually nothing
to make CERCLA more useful. Likewise, the USEPA failed to respond until
1994 when it created its new Pilot Program. No longer content to wait for
effective federal programs to be developed, a number of states, including Ohio,
began to work on their own toxic waste problems. In order to understand how
Ohio's VAP is structured and operates, it is necessary to briefly evaluate the
federal scheme of toxic waste cleanup.
$145,092.37, and expenses were $1,202,998.60. In 1997, revenues were $390,911.68, and
expenses were $927,816.57. See id.
29 See Rimer, supra note 8, at 106. Rimer points out that some critics feel that the states
are moving too fast in promulgating VAPs and thereby putting public health and safety at risk.
In her Article, Rimer discusses the efficacy of a federal VAP, which she mentions would almost
certainly preempt state VAPs. See id.
3 0 Most of the suggestions are legislative in nature but may be helpful to a practitioner in
determining the overall value of the program in a particular factual situation.
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A. Summary of the Federal Government's Approach to Toxic Substance
Cleanup
Before 1980 and the adoption of CERCLA,31 anyone interested in
purchasing and potentially developing a former industrial site had little to fear.
Environmental regulation had been largely left to the states and it usually took a
rather egregiolis violation to arouse state environmental protection agency
interest.32 In 1980, however, in response to the Love Canal incident and due to a
growing awareness of the massive number of contaminated sites across the
United States, Congress enacted CERCLA.33
At the time, CERCLA appeared to be just what the doctor ordered. Its
provisions were aimed at targeting the worst sites and ensuring their rapid
remediation.34 Inevitably, dreams of a quick fix to America's toxic hazard
problem were dashed as a large amount of litigation begging interpretation of
CERCLA's vague terms flooded the courts.35
The interpreting courts held that CERCLA imposed "strict, joint and several,
and retroactive liability on [potentially responsible parties (PRPs)].' '36 These
interpretations of CERCLA liability resulted in a chilling effect on the sale and
31 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
32 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), also known as the Solid Waste
Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994), pre-dated CERCLA by four years. However,
RCRA's provisions were directed primarily at regulating the management of hazardous wastes
instead of hazardous substance cleanup. Although the fifty states obviously viewed
environmental issues with varying degrees of seriousness, the federal government must have
lost faith in the states after the Love Canal incident. Both the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7671q (1994), and the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994),
attempted to leave as much enforcement authority as possible with the states, but, in the end,
Congress centralized enforcement and regulatory power with the USEPA. For a basic, yet
comprehensive overview of the evolution of the CWA and CAA, see ROGER W. FINDLEY &
DANIEL A. FARBER, CASEs AND MATERIALs ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 253-364 (West
Publishing Co. 4th ed. 1995).
33 See Daniel Michel, The CERCLA Paradox and Ohio's Response to the Brownfield
Problem: Senate Bill 221,26 U. TOL. L. REV. 435,438 (1995).
34 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
35 See Michelle LeVeque, Note, Rationales for Applying CERCLA Retroactively After
Landgraf v. USI Film Products: Overcoming the Presumption Against Retroactivity, 59 OHIO
ST. L.J. 603, 604-05 n.8 (1998) (focusing on the retroactive application of CERCLA, but citing
various cases addressing strict and joint and several liability); see also Michel, supra note 33, at
438-54 (summarizing court interpretations of the CERCLA liability scheme).
3 6 LeVeque, supra note 35, at 604-05 n.8.
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development of industrial properties.3 7 Furthermore, once lenders discovered that
they would not be immune from CERCLA, funds for the sale and development of
former industrial properties nearly dried up completely.3 8 The reality was that
CERCLA was not fulfilling the promise of remediating America's toxic waste
woes.
39
Despite widespread frustration and Congressional inaction, not until 1994 did
the USEPA respond by announcing the federal Brownfields Economic
Redevelopment Initiative.40 The main goals of the program were to reinvigorate
cities in the Northeast and Midwest and to discourage development of tempting
greenfields. 41 The USEPA's Brownfields initiative involved (1) the removal of
25,000 sites from the Superfund Site Tracking System, (2) a new statement of
policy regarding lender liability and prospective purchaser agreements, and (3)
pilot projects to assist with the development of new, sensible policies.42
The most interesting and hopeful aspect of the Brownfields initiative is the
pilot program.43 The pilot program targets cities with the most potential to benefit
from remedial activities and then supplies funds to test new and innovative
programs.44 The pilot program offers grants of up to $200,000 45 The grants,
however, may not be used for the actual remediation. This pilot program is still in
its infant stages.
37 See Michel, supra note 33, at 435 ("The measures employed by Congress, primarily
through ... [CERCLA] ... have had a chilling effect on lenders."). Other issues have been
identified as problematic in brownfields remediation. Some of the issues, both legal and
practical, that have been identified by other commentators are: "1. ambiguous legal liability; 2.
lack of concentrated expertise; 3. potentially substantial capital costs; 4. insufficient financing;
5. clouded federal, state, and local environmental and legal policies; 6. entrenched attitudes
among regulators; 7. absence of a consistent redevelopment framework; 8. public opposition; 9.
limited demand for redeveloped sites; and 10. competition from greenfields." BROWNFIELDS,
supra note 10, at 9.
38 See Michel, supra note 33, at 437-48 (discussing United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.,
901 F.2d 1550 (1 th Cir. 1990), United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573
(D. Md. 1986), and the USEPA's selective enforcement rule, which was subsequently
overruled in Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
39 Not everyone agrees that CERCLA has been a failure. Compare Michel, supra note 33,
at 438-53 (outlining CERCLA's difficulties in detail), with Walter E. Mugdan, The Facts
Speakfor Themselves: A Fundamentally Different Superfund Program, A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE
OF STUDY: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 679 (1997) (arguing that CERCLA has been a success).
40 See Announcement of Extension of Application Deadline for Brownfields Economic
Redevelopment Initiative Pilots, 60 Fed. Reg. 9684 (1995), cited in Sweeney, supra note 18, at
116.
41 See Sweeney, supra note 18, at 117.
4 2 See id. at 117-19.
4 3 See generally CHARLEs BARTSCH & ELIZABETH COLLATON, BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING
AND REUSING CONTAMINATED PROPERTiEs 32-40 (1997).
44 See id
45 See id at 32.
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B. Ohio's Approach to Toxic Substance Cleanup
In June of 1994, the Ohio General Assembly, realizing that the number of
contaminated sites in Ohio had not diminished in any significant way since
CERCLA, enacted Senate Bill 221, Ohio's Voluntary Action Program.4 6 The
accompanying administrative rules, however, were not finally promulgated until
the middle of 1997 47 The statute and accompanying rules set forth a
comprehensive program aimed at quick, efficient, and effective remediation.
1. How Ohio's VAP Works
a. "Phase I and Phase HIPropery Assessments"
Once eligibility is established,48 the volunteer may begin a "phase I property
assessment."49 The broad purpose of a phase I assessment is to determine if there
is "any reason to believe" that there has been or presently is a release of hazardous
4 6 Codified at OHIOREV. CODE ANN. §§ 3746.01-3746.99 (West 1998).
4 7 See OHIO ADMIN. CODE §§ 3745-300-01 to 3745-300-99 (1996 & Supp. 1996-1997).
48 Ohio's VAP permits extensive participation. Generally, unless specifically exempted by
the Ohio Revised Code, a site will be eligible for participation in the program. See § 3746.10:
Except as otherwise provided in section 3746.02 of the Revised Code, any person
may undertake a voluntary action under this chapter and rules adopted under it to identify
and address potential sources of contamination by hazardous substances or petroleum of
soil, sediments, surface water, or ground water on or underlying property and to establish
that the property meets applicable standards.
§ 3746.10; see also § 3746.02 (included in the exemptions are properties precluded from
participation by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251 (1994); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6921
(1994); the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994); the Comprehensive
Environmental, Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994);
the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(f) (1994); portions of property for which closure
is required by OHIO REVISED CODE ANNOTATED § 3734; properties subject to remediation rules
adopted under OHIO REVISED CODE ANNOTATED §§ 3737.88, 3737.882, 3737.889; properties
subject to OHIO REVISED CODE ANNOTATED § 1509; and other properties where the director of
environmental protection has issued enforcement orders under OHIo REVISED CODE
ANNOTATED chapters 3704,3734, and 6111).
In addition to meeting the statutorily imposed conditions for participation listed at section
3746.02 of the Ohio Revised Code, the volunteer should also consult Ohio's newly adopted
administrative rules regarding eligibility for participation. See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-
02 (1996 & Supp. 1996-1997).
4 9 See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-06. The statutory authority for the adoption of
rules regarding "phase I and II property assessments," generic numerical cleanup standards,
standards for certified professionals and laboratories, and criteria for no further action letters
may be found in OHIO REVISED CODE ANNOTATED § 3746.04.
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waste or petroleum on the relevant property.50 The volunteer must (1) perform a
review of current and past uses of the property,51 (2) review any environmental
history or any hazardous substance or petroleum release history,52 and (3)
conclude a phase I property assessment report.53 The volunteer must identify in
the report all areas where hazardous substances "are or may be emanating
from."54 The results of a phase I property assessment may be used in support of a
"no further action letter."55 No further action letters are drafted by certified
professionals and signify the end of a voluntary remediation. The OEPA may
50 See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-06(B). The assessment is also used to characterize
the site for the program's purposes and to determine whether a "phase II property assessment
-will be necessary, and if so, what its scope should be." Id.
51 See id § 3745-300-06(D).
The volunteer must, at a minimum, perform a review of the historic and current uses
of the property, review the environmental history of the property, and review the property
hazardous substance or petroleum release history, and must conduct a property inspection.
Any current owner of a property upon which a voluntary action is being conducted must
provide the volunteer any information known by that owner which may be relevant to
determining whether any release of hazardous substances or petroleum has occurred on,
underlying, or is emanating from the property. Any information that is determined not to
be reasonably available, as defined in this chapter, must be identified and an explanation
must be provided in the "Phase I Property Assessment" report as to why it was not
reasonably available.
Id.
52 See id.
53 See id § 3745-300-06W(11)-(2).
The volunteer must complete a written "Phase I Property Assessment" report which,
at a minimum, includes: (1) An introduction identifying: the property, including the legal
description of the property; the date that the "Phase I Property Assessment" and the written
report were completed; the name and job title of each person conducting the investigation;
and a summary of the current and intended use of the property;, (2) Conclusions regarding
whether there is any reason to believe that a release of hazardous substances or petroleum
has or may have occurred on, underlying, or emanating from the property, the report must
identify the hazardous substances or petroleum which the 'phase HI Property Assessment"
will evaluate and the areas where these hazardous substances or petroleum are known or
suspected to be present
Id
54 Id. § 3745-300-06(F)(1). A volunteer may demonstrate that any release is de minimis by
meeting the requirements of section 3745-300-06(G) of the Ohio Administrative Code. This
provision states a release is de minimis if it does not exceed residential direct contact soil
standards, is confined to a nine-square-foot area, and was not the result of disposal
mismanagement A "phase II property assessment" is not required if a release is found to be de
minimis under this rule. See id § 3745-300-06(G).
55 See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text
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grant covenants not to sue based on the information contained in the letter.5 6
A "phase II property assessment' must be conducted if the phase I property
assessment reveals any information that "establishes any reason to believe that a
release of hazardous substances or petroleum has or may have occurred on,
underlying or is emanating from the property. '57 The purpose of a phase II
property assessment is to ensure that the property meets any applicable standard
or to determine whether remedial standards conducted according to administrative
standards58 "have or will" achieve applicable standards.59 A phase II property
assessment may only involve data collection and analysis.60 The initial data
collection and analysis, however, may indicate that further procedures will be
necessary to meet the requirements of the phase II property assessment.61
Additionally, a volunteer may be required to perform a variety of activities aimed
at remediating groundwater contamination and protecting groundwater.62 Finally,
volunteers must complete a phase I property assessment written report 63
b. Variances
If a volunteer is granted a variance, he or she is permitted to ignore Ohio's
generic numerical standards64 and follow the varied standard approved by the
56 See infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text
57 OHIo ADMiN. CODE § 3745-300-06(A)(1). If the release is determined to be de minimis
under section 3745-300-06(G) of the Ohio Administrative Code, the volunteer is not required to
undertake a "phase II property assessment." Id.
58 See id § 3745-300-15 (regarding procedures for remediation).
59 Id. § 3745-300-07(C).
60 See id § 3745-300-07(D).
61 See id.
62 See id § 3745-300-07(D)(2)-(9) (requiring a volunteer, under the circumstances listed
in the text, to identify existing or potential exposure pathways, protect groundwater, determine
applicable standards as guided by sections 3745-300-08, -09, -10, and -15 of the Ohio
Administrative Code, determine concentration of relevant chemicals in identified areas,
determine ground water yield, classify groundwater, determine sources of groundwater
contamination, and implement an appropriate remedy).
63 See id. § 3745-300-07(J)(l)-(14) (requiring the final report to include at a minimum: (1)
an introduction similar to that required in the phase I property assessment report; (2) summary
of amendments to the phase I property assessment report; (3) statement of limitations and
qualifications that impact the phase II assessment report; (4) a summary of data collection and
results; (5) summary of rationale behind sampling and testing activities; (6) summary of
determinations made; (7) summary of background determinations; (8) summary of any models
used, (9) indication of whether the property met applicable standards and whether any remedial
activity will be required, (10) description, date, source, and location of documents used in
preparation of this report; (11) an appendix of supporting documentation; (12) copies of risk
assessment reports; (13) property map indicating the location and concentration of any
identified chemicals).
64 Ohio's program is relatively unique in that the OEPA administrative rules specify
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OEPA. Ohio has a liberal standard for granting variances to its generic numerical
standards.65 Persons entering the VAP may apply for a variance from applicable
standards, if (1) it is technically infeasible to con~ply with applicable standards at
the VAP site or (2) the costs of compliance with applicable standards
substantially exceeds the economic benefits. 66 Likewise, a variance may be
granted if the standards set forth in the variance application will improve the
condition of the environment at the site and protect public health and safety,67 or
the standards set forth in the variance application "are necessary to promote,
protect, preserve, or enhance employment opportunities or the reuse of the
property. '68
Once the director of environmental protection establishes that an application
for a variance is complete, the director schedules a public meeting in the county in
which the variance is requested.69 The director is obligated to notify each adjacent
landowner of the meeting by mail.7° When deciding whether or not the variance
is to be granted, the director is to consider advice of the property revitalization
board71 and comments received either in writing or at the public meeting.72 After
the meeting, the director of environmental protection either accepts or denies the
acceptable background levels of certain toxic substances. See id. § 3745-300-08. If the
volunteer encounters a toxic substance not covered by this section, he or she is guided by
section 3745-300-09 of the Ohio Administrative Code.65 It should also be noted that variances from established standardized criteria are
relatively costly. The current rules require the recipient of a variance to pay $18,500. See id.§ 3745-300-03(C)(9). Of course, the variance could save significant expenditures on
remediation that may not really be necessary to protect the public's health and safety. The deft
volunteer should always investigate whether a variance might be feasibly granted in any
specific situation.
66 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.09(A)(1)(a)--(b) (West 1998). 'Technical
infeasibility" occurs when "available technology for remediating hazardous substance(s) or
petroleum, or both, at the affected property will not achieve applicable standards." OHIo
ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-12(E)(1) (1996 & Supp. 1996-1997). Note the Ohio Revised Code
and administrative rules do not supply any further explanation of the cost-benefit analysis.
67 See OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 3746.09(A)(2) (West 1998).
68 Id. § 3746.09(A)(3).
69 See id § 3746.09(B)(2).
70 See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-12(H)(2) (1996 & Supp. 1996-1997). Further, the
applicant or a representative of the applicant and a representative of the OEPA are required to
attend the meeting. See id § 3745-300-12(K)(l)-(2).
71 The board is created pursuant to chapter 3746 of the Ohio Revised Code. The board is
to meet bimonthly to advise the director regarding the issuance or denial of variances, develop a
clearinghouse to disseminate information regarding financial incentives available to volunteers,
and draft an annual report regarding proposals for administrative or legislative changes
regarding available financial incentives. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.08(A)-(C) (West
1998).
72 See OHIO ADMN. CODE § 3745-300-12(LX1)-(3) (1996 & Supp. 1996-1997).
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application.73 Any granted variance should state alternative, applicable standards
with specificity.74
c. Certified Professionals' Role and No Further Action Letters
Unlike many other states' programs,75 Ohio's VAP provides for extensive
involvement of certified professionals.76 Certified professionals 77 carry out phase
I and phase II property assessments, and draft variance applications and no further
action letters. Obviously, the most important part of the certified professional's
job is to ensure that public health and safety is protected and that volunteers are in
compliance with applicable standards.78
However, the most important function that the certified professional serves,
in the eyes of most volunteers, is drafting the letter of no further action upon
which the director of environmental protection may predicate a covenant not to
sup.79 No further action letters may be issued if, after completing a phase I
property assessment, the certified professional determines that there is "no reason
to believe" any hazardous substances or petroleum has been or may be released,
or the certified professional determines that any release of hazardous substance or
petroleum is de minimis.80 No further action letters may also be issued if, after
73 See id § 3745-300-12(0) (explaining a variance will be denied if it is not technically
infeasible to comply with applicable standards, the costs of complying with the applicable
standards do not outweigh the economic benefits, the variance alternative standards are not
adequate to protect public health and safety, or the alternative standards do not affect
employment opportunities in any manner).
74 See id § 3745-300-12(N). The director is not limited by the alternative, applicable
standards set forth in the variance application, but may impose different standards that are
necessary to protect the public's health and safety. See id.
75 Most states' programs are designed in a manner in which the state environmental
protection agency is involved in the earliest stages of voluntary action. For examples, consult
BROWNFIELDS, supra note 10, at 287-681.
76 SeegenerallyOPo REV. CODEANN. § 3746.071 (West 1998).
77 In order to become certified a person must have earned at least a bachelor's degree in
"biology, chemistry, environmental science, geology, hydrology, toxicology, public health," or
hazardous waste management subdisciplines, "appropriate areas of engineering," or other
director approved curriculum; possess eight years of professional experience (three related to
project management or supervision), "possess professional competence and knowledge," and
have good moral character. See OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-05(B) (1996 & Supp. 1996-
1997).
7 8 See id. § 3745-300-05(F)(2)(a) ("A certified professional must hold paramount the
public health, safety, welfare, and the environment in the performance of his professional
services."). See generally id. § 3745-300-05(F) (detailing the certified professional's standards
of conduct and highlighting that the certified professional is primarily responsible for ensuring
the public aims of Ohio's VAP are served).
7 9 See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.12 (West 1998).
80 See OIO ADMN. CODE § 3745-300-13(A)(1)-(2) (1996 & Supp. 1996-1997).
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completing a phase II property assessment, the certified professional determines
that concentrations of chemicals on the property do not exceed applicable
standards, "or that applicable standards have been or will be met through
remediation. 81 The volunteer has ultimate authority to decide whether the no
further action letter will be submitted to the director of environmental
protection. 82
d. Audits and Covenants Not to Sue
The director of environmental protection is under a mandatory duty to
conduct audits of at least 25% of no further action letters involving remedial
activities and 25% of letters involving no remedial action.83 The audits are
designed to ensure that properties on which remedial activities were performed
meet applicable standards, that certified professionals and certified laboratories
possess the qualifications for certification,84 and that the certified professional and
certified laboratory have issued a no further action letter that is consistent with
applicable remediation standards.85 Ohio's administrative rules require the
director of environmental protection to randomly select those sites that will be
audited in any given year.86
81 See id § 3745-300-13(A)(3)-(4).
82 See id § 3745-300-13(G)(1).
83 See Omo REv. CODEANN. § 3746.17(B) (West 1998).
84 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
85 See OHIO ADMN. CODE § 3745-300-13(A)(1)-(4) (1996 & Supp. 1996-1997).
86 See id § 3745-300-14(D). Note that there are several situations where the director is
required by statute to audit a site. These sites consist of what is known as a "mandatory audit
pool" that includes no further action letters produced by professionals certified under interim
rules, laboratory analyses performed by laboratories certified under the interim rules, letters that
the director believes to be submitted fraudulently, letters issued by a certified professional
whose certification was subsequently revoked, letters issued that contain analyses performed by
a laboratories whose certification has subsequently been revoked, or letters that were the basis
for a covenant not to sue which were subsequently revoked. See id § 3745-300-14(A)(4)(a)-(f).
There is also a "priority audit pool" that applies to letters based on property specific risk
assessments or engineering controls or institutional controls which restrict the use of the
property. See id § 3745-300-14(A)(5)(a)-(b).
The administrative rules distinguish between a "tier I audit" and a "tier II audit." Tier I
audits require a review of documents pertaining to no further action letters "held or produced"
by certified professionals, volunteers, current owners, or certified laboratories. Tier II audits
require a "physical inspection and investigation" of property. Such "inspection and
investigation" includes the taking of soil, surface water, air, sediment, or groundwater samples.
See id § 3745-300-14(A)(7)-(8). Tier II audits are carried out if tier I documents are
"inadequate to substantiate the no further action letter, or if the director has a reasonable belief
that the no further action letter has been based on fraudulent or inaccurate information or
documentation." Id § 3745-300-14(H)(2)(a). The director may also perform tier II audits on
any site selected randomly for a tier I audit. See id. § 3745-300-14(H)(2)(b).
1999]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNTAL
On the basis of a no further action letter that may or may not have been
audited, the director of environmental protection may grant a covenant not to
sue.87 A covenant not to sue acts to release the volunteer from any liability to the
state88 for any further investigation or remediation of hazardous substances or
petroleum releases when the property has undergone a phase I property
assessment or a phase II property assessment.89
The director must deny the issuance of a covenant not to sue if: (1) the no
further action letter does not comply with the statutory scheme or administrative
rules regarding appropriate form and content; (2) the director believes that public
health and safety is not protected by the remedy described in the no further action
letter, or (3) the no further action letter was submitted fraudulently.90 In the
absence of any one of these three problems, the director "shall" issue a covenant
not to sue.91
The covenant not to sue cannot act to release the volunteer from liability to
the state for damages to natural resources for which the state may have a claim
under CERCLA.92 There are also special provisions regarding the issuance of
covenants not to sue when the volunteer has elected to use engineering controls as
part of the remediation.93
The institutional controls discussed above are explained in Ohio Revised Code section
3746.05. Basically, applicable standards may be achieved on a property through the use of
controls that restrict access to or use of property, or applicable standards may be achieved
through the use of engineering controls that mitigate the release of or contain hazardous
substances or petroleum. See OIHO REv. CODEANN. § 3746.05 (West 1998).
87 See generally OFHO REV. CODEANN. § 3746.12 (West 1998).
88 Note that a covenant not to sue issued under the statute does not release the individual
from liability to third parties or the federal government.
89 See OHio REV. CODEANN. § 3746.12(A)(1) (West 1998).
90 See id § 3746.12(C)(1)-(3).
91 See id § 3746.12(A). It should be noted that the administrative rules provide no
guidance to the OEPA regarding the content of a covenant not to sue.
The statute also addresses the issue of when the covenant will not be considered effective
and circumstances under which the covenant may be revoked. See id § 3746.12(B).
For any property that did not involve the use of institutional controls or for which the
volunteer did not apply for a consolidated standards permit, the director "shall" issue a covenant
not to sue "by issuance of an order as a final action" within thirty days of the receipt of the no
further action letter and any necessary verification. See id. § 3746.13(A). If institutional controls
were used or a consolidated standards permit was issued, the director "shall" issue the covenant
not to sue within ninety days of the receipt of the no further action letter and any necessary
verification. See id. § 3746.13(B).
9 2 See id. § 3746.12(A)(1)(b)-(c). The relevant CERCLA provision is located at 42 U.S.C.
§ 107(f) (1994) ("In the case of an injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources... liability shall be to the United States Government and to any State for natural
resources within the State or belonging to, managed by, or controlled by, or appertaining to
such State....").
93 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.12(A)(2)(a)-(c) (West 1998). Some examples of
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2. Cost Recovery and Liability Protection94
Typically, a volunteer will want to hold prior landowners or others who
contributed to toxic waste problems responsible for their share of the cost of the
cleanup. Owners and operators and any other person who "caused or contributed
to a release of hazardous substances at or upon the property, [are] liable to the
person who conducted the voluntary action for the costs of conducting the
voluntary action."95 If two or more persons have contributed to the release of
hazardous substances or petroleum, each is liable for the release that they caused
or contributed to.96 When apportioning damages among liable parties, the court or
the jury may consider equitable factors.97
Ohio's cost recovery statute is explicitly retroactive in application98 and
engineering controls are "fences, cap systems, cover systems, and landscaping." OHIO ADMIN.
CODE § 3745-300-09(D)(2)(d) (Supp. 1997).
94 Ohio's General Assembly also recognized that potential volunteers may be discouraged
by the fact that any remediation may produce documents that could later be used against them
for liability purposes. This recognition led to the establishment of section 374628 of the Ohio
Revised Code which protects volunteers:
[l]nformation, documents, reports, or data produced, or any samples collected as a result of
entering into and participating in the voluntary action program... are not deemed
admissible against the person undertaking the voluntary action, and are not discoverable, in
any civil or administrative proceeding against the person undertaking the voluntary action.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.28(C) (West 1998). The rule does not apply to criminal
proceedings or to violations of the Ohio VAP disclosure of information provision, which
requires the disclosure of the names of those involved in a voluntary remediation and some
other preliminary information.
9 5 Id. § 3746.23(B). "Costs of conducting the voluntary action" include: identifying
potential sources of contamination, investigating the nature and extent of any contamination,
preparing a remedial plan, conducting remedial activities (including future costs of operating
engineering controls), preparing and submitting a no further action letter, OEPA oversight
costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and court costs associated with recovery of costs of
conducting a voluntary action. Costs incurred to permit a higher use than the current or most
recent use are not recoverable. See iL § 3746.23(A)(1)-(7).
9 6 See id § 3746.23 (3).
9 7 Section 3746.23(D) of the Ohio Revised Code provides:
JIThe nature and amount of hazardous substances stored, treated, disposed of, used,
and released by each person; the length of time that each person owned or operated the
property; each person's history of compliance with applicable federal and state
environmental laws and rules in the use and operation of the property; and any other
factors that the jury or court considers to be appropriate.
Id. § 3746.23(D).
9 8See id § 3746.23(E-).
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permits contractual apportionment of liability between potentially responsible
parties.99 However, cost recovery may not be made against (1) a person who
neither caused nor contributed to a release of hazardous waste in any "material
respect," (2) a landlord that lacked knowledge that a lessee was causing or
contributing to a release of hazardous substances, (3) the state when it
involuntarily acquired ownership, (4) the state when it voluntarily acquires
ownership under Chapter 163 of the Ohio Revised Code, (5) an owner or operator
responsible for a release of petroleum that ultimately mixed with hazardous
substances when the petroleum release was dealt with in a voluntary action, (6) a
holder in compliance covered by Ohio's secured party liability laws, or (7) a
fiduciary or trustee covered by Ohio's fiduciary immunity laws.100
In order to encourage brownfield redevelopment, Ohio's VAP also provides
extensive protections for persons holding a property to protect a security interest
and for fiduciaries and trustees. 10 1 If a person is primarily holding "indicia of
ownership" in a property "primarily to protect a security interest" and is not
"participating in the management of a property," the person is not liable for the
costs of conducting a voluntary action or the costs of investigating or remediating
a release or threatened release of hazardous substances or petroleum at that
site.102 A fiduciary "who acquires ownership or control of property without
having owned, operated, or participated in the management of the property" prior
to acquiring such an interest is not liable for the costs of conducting a voluntary
action or the costs of investigating or remediating a release or threatened release
of hazardous substances or petroleum at that site.1 03 The fiduciary must not have
engaged in willful, wanton, or intentional tortious conduct that caused or
contributed to the release of the hazardous substance or petroleum.' 0 4 In addition,
Ohio's legislature has provided important immunities from tort actions arising
from cleanup activities that are in compliance with relevant laws and
administrative rules as long as the conduct is not willful, wanton, or
intentional. 105
9 9 See id § 3746.23(F). However, contractual apportionment of liability does not affect the
parties' "rights, liabilities, or obligations" to the state with respect to the parties' contract. Id
100 See id § 3746.23(G)(l)-(7).
101 See §§ 3746.26-.27. States vary greatly in the degree of protection they extend to
lenders and fiduciaries generally. The trend clearly seems to be in the direction of increased
protection. However, several states with VAPs do not provide significant protection. For
example, see Arkansas's statutory scheme, which provides no real significant liability
protection. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-7-501-522 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1997).
102 See OHIO REXV. CODE ANN. § 3746.26(A)(1) (West 1998). Unlike CERCLA, Ohio's
VAP precisely defines "indicia of ownership" and "participation in management." See id
§ 3746.26(B).
103 See idl § 3746.27(A).
104 See id § 3746.27(A)(1).
105 See generally id § 3746.24 (setting forth the immunity rules).
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3. Financial Incentives
The Ohio General Assembly has provided several types of financial
incentives to encourage participation in its VAP and the redevelopment of
brownfields. 106
a. Tax Exemptions
Probably the most effective incentive is Ohio's comprehensive tax exemption
program.10 7 The director of environmental protection is to notify the tax
commissioner when a covenant not to sue has been issued for a particular
property.108 The tax commissioner must grant exemptions for real property tax
for "the increase in the assessed value of land [caused by remediation]
constituting property that is described in the certification, and of the increase in
the assessed value of improvements, buildings, fixtures, and structures situated on
that land at the time the order is issued."10 9 The tax exemption is granted to all
properties that receive a covenant not to sue for 100% of the increased assessed
values for a period of ten years.110 Further, upon finding that a volunteer is
qualified,"' a county or municipality may enter into an agreement with the
volunteer whereby the volunteer is required to invest 250%112 of the "value... of
the land, buildings, improvements, structures, and fixtures... to establish,
expand, renovate, or occupy a facility and hire new employees, or preserve
employment opportunities for existing employees"' 13 in return for tax exemptions
106 See generally BRoWNFIELDS, supra note 10, at 545-46 (explaining available
incentives).
107 The effectiveness of this incentive assumes that release from tax liability actually
encourages brownfields redevelopment. There is not yet, and indeed may never be, any
empirical evidence on this point
108 See OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 5709.87(B) (West 1998).
109 Id. § 5709.87(C).
I10 See id. If the covenant not to sue is ever revoked by the director of environmental
protection, the owner of the property is liable for the amount of taxes that would have been
charged against the property if not for the tax exemption. See id § 5709.87(E). Section
5709.87(D) of the Ohio Revised Code states that the tax exemption is not affected by the sale or
transfer of the property. The exemption continues until the ten year period expires. However,
under the current language of the statute, innocent owners could be held liable for taxes accrued
prior to the purchase when a covenant not to sue is revoked after purchase. See id
§ 5709.87(D).
111 A volunteer is "qualified" if he has demonstrated "financial responsibility and business
experience to create and preserve employment opportunities at the project site and improve the
economic climate of the county or municipal corporation." Id § 5709.88(D).
112 The percentage is determined from the taxable value of the land immediately prior to
the agreement. See id
113 Id
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of up to 100% of the property for a period of up to ten years beyond the automatic
ten year 100% exemption.11 4
b. Other Financial Incentives
In addition to tax exemptions, Ohio offers volunteers low-interest loans and
limited grants to volunteers. The low-interest loans are only available through the
water pollution control loan fund to volunteers whose remediation activities will
improve water quality.115 Under the Urban and Rural Initiative Grant Program,116
limited funds are granted to assist in the development of sites in qualified areas.
However, this grant program ended in 1999.117
III. ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT
Despite the fact that Ohio's VAP has been a model statute to other states in
some regards, there remains room for improvement. 118 Part A of this section
evaluates incentives that Ohio does not currently offer but may want to consider
supplying in order to increase volunteer involvement Part B discuses some
general methods, without increased participation as a goal, by which Ohio's VAP
might be improved.
A. Increasing Incentives for the Volunteer
Cleanups can be extremely costly. These costs often deter potential
114 See id § 5709.88(D)(1)-(2). The municipality may also agree to provide services or
assistance that they are authorized to provide. See iL § 5709.88(D)(3).
115 See id §§ 6123.032, 6111.036.
116 See id. §§ 122.19-.22. The Urban and Rural Initiative Grant Program set aside $20
million for the development of distressed areas, labor surplus areas, inner cities, and situational
distress areas. The grants are available to counties, townships, municipal corporations, nonprofit
economic development entities, community improvement organizations, and port authorities.
See id. § 122.19. They are to be used for land acquisition, renovations, infrastructure
improvements, and voluntary action programs. See id. § 122.20(A).
117 See id. §§ 122.19-.22 (The repeal date was January 1, 1999).
118 Ohio's program has achieved some level of success. As of February 1998, the OEPA
announced on its web site that twelve no further action letters had been accepted and covenants
not to sue had been issued (one issued in 1995, six issued in 1996, three issued in 1997, and two
issued in 1998). Further, nineteen no further action letters were pending. Three sites receiving
covenants not to sue estimate that the program has enabled them to provide approximately 565
new jobs. Three of the sites whose applications are pending estimate that the program vill
enable them to create approximately 772 new jobs. Information formerly found at
<http:l/www.epa.ohio.gov/derr/vap/whatsnew/whatsnew.htrl>. While OEPA has not
continued to maintain its chart of the VAP's success, volunteers should look at
<http'/www.epa.ohio.gov/derr/volume.html>.
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volunteers. Incentives that decrease exposure to future liability, increase the
likelihood of recovery from potentially responsible parties (PRPs-parties not
participating in the cleanup that may also be liable for cleanup costs), and
otherwise save the volunteer valuable resources will surely increase involvement
beyond what it would be without such incentives.1 19 The end result of increased
participation is more jobs, a wider tax base, and an improved environment.
1. Added Liability Protection
a. State Assistance in Obtaining Protection from Federal Liability
The Ohio volunteer may obtain immunity from liability to the state by
obtaining a covenant not to sue.120 However, this immunity does not extend to
potential federal Superfund liability. An individual could be in compliance with
Ohio's VAP, yet still be subject to a federal action. In attempts to placate fears of
federal liability, several states have negotiated memoranda of agreement (MOA)
with the USEPA.12 1 In these agreements, the USEPA typically states that it
approves of the state VAP and does not plan or anticipate any federal action under
Superfund law unless there are exceptional circumstances whereby the site poses
an eminent threat or emergency situation. 122
Ohio has not yet entered into an MOA with the USEPA although it is
currently negotiating such an agreement. 123 Presently, volunteers might attempt
to obtain a comfort letter from the USEPA124 or enter into a prospective
119 Recall that CERCLA provides no such incentives.
120 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.13 (West 1998). This immunity is not without
qualification. For example, the state does not give up its right to pursue claims for natural
resource damage under CERCLA. There are also strict provisions regarding immunity from
state liability when engineering controls are used. See id. § 3746.12(AX1)-(2).
121 These states include Colorado, Illinois (1989 program), Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Texas, and Wisconsin. See BROWNFIELDS, supra note 10, at 346,394,403,468,490-
91.
122 For some representative examples of memoranda of agreement, visit Fink Zausmer,
Brownfields (last modified May 14, 1997) <http'J/www.lawsite.com/organization/
BROWNFIELDS/illmemo>; Fink Zausmer, Brownfields (last modified May 14, 1997)
<http://vww.lawsite.comorganization/BROWNFIELDS/minmemo.html>; Fink Zausmer,
Brownfields (last modified May 14, 1997) <http'//www.lawsite.com/organization/
BROWNFIELDS/wismemo.html>.
123 See BROWNF1ELDS, supra note 10, at 544. In addition to negotiating with the OEPA,
former Ohio governor George Voinovich indicated that state officials are lobbying Congress to
gain approval of Ohio's VAP. See Randall Edwards, Governor Lauds State's Industrial
Cleanup Program, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 16, 1997, at C4.
124 See Announcement and Publication of Guidance on Agreements with Prospective
Purchasers of Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed.
Reg. 34,792, 37,798 (1995); Policy on the Issuance of Comfort Letters, United States
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purchaser agreement with the USEPA.125 Obviously, transaction costs are high
when each volunteer must separately approach the USEPA if he or she desires
any assurance of freedom from Superfund liability. Such costs would be avoided
if an MOA were finalized. 126
Although it is difficult to state with any certainty why an MOA has not been
finalized, several aspects of Ohio's VAP may be viewed as suspect by the
USEPA. First, Ohio's confidentiality and privilege provision127 is unlikely to
survive USEPA scrutiny.128 The USEPA has expressed dissatisfaction with such
confidentiality provisions. It has even threatened to withdraw or refuse delegation
of authority to enforce federal environmental statutes to states that have such
privileges. 129 The USEPA maintains that, although a remediation or audit is
voluntary, the information obtained should be admissible against the volunteer in
criminal and civil proceedings. 130 The USEPA has taken the position that it is not
to be bound by confidentiality provisions in federal enforcement actions. 131
Second, the general structure of the Ohio program with its extensive
delegation of authority to volunteers may be disfavored by the USEPA.132
Environmental Protection Agency (last modified Aug. 13, 1998) <http//hwvw.epa.gov/
swerosps/bf/html-doc/comfplcy.html>. A comfort letter is a statement from the USEPA that if
the disclosed remediation is true, the USEPA is unlikely to take action.
125 Prospective purchaser agreements were a part of the USEPA's 1995 Brownfields
Action Agenda. These agreements are covenants not to sue issued by the federal government.
The remediator is responsible for negotiating the agreement.
However, prospective purchaser agreements are of lirnited value to Ohio volunteers. They
are only available to purchasers of NFL sites or sites where action has been taken or is
anticipated by the USEPA. See U.S.E.P.A., BROWNFIELDS ACTION AGENDA 4-5 (1995), cited
in Wendy E. Wagner, Overview of Federal and State Law Governing Brownfields Cleanup, in
BROWNFIELDS, supra note 10, at 25-26. Prospective purchaser agreements may also provide
inadequate protection against other potential plaintiffs such as state govemments or third parties
and against suits brought under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Prospective
purchaser agreements may not act to protect subsequent purchasers or lenders. See id. at 26; see
also Fink Zausmer, USEPA Model Agreement on Settlements with Prospective Purchasers of
Contaminated Property (last modified May 14, 1997) <http'/www.lawsite.com/
organization/BRoWNFIELDs/epaagr, html>.
126 Instead of each volunteer incurring the costs of contacting the USEPA and negotiating
an agreement, an MOA would serve as a general assurance against federal action.
127 See OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 374628 (West 1998); supra note 94. See generally
Geltman, supra note 18, at 189-209 (discussing the common law audit privilege).
128 See generally Brooks M. Beard, The New Environmental Federalism: Can the EPA's
Voluntary Audit Policy Survive?, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1997) (discussing tension between state
law and USEPA policies designed to cleanup brownfields).
129 See id at 13 (explaining that such privileges lead to reduced enforcement capability).
130 See id at2, 13-14.
131 See id. at 6-12.
132 This is simply a proposition based on the fact that states which have MOAs with the
USEPA all have statutes that involve the state environmental protection agency at preliminary
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Although it is unlikely that Ohio's General Assembly would soon change the
general structure of Ohio's VAP to reduce the delegation of authority to
volunteers, it may be that a redtafling or repealing of the confidentiality provision
could placate the USEPA and ultimately assist in the completion of an MOA. The
disadvantage of any such action would be that volunteers may be more
discouraged by losing the privilege than by the possibility of federal action.
b. Protection from Third Party Liability
Not only are Ohio volunteers not protected from federal liability, but they are
also vulnerable to third party liability.'33 Volunteers who have followed Ohio's
generic toxic cleanup guidelines should be immune from tort suits related to the
post-cleanup character of the property and tort claims arising during remediation,
assuming the remediation is properly carried out.
If a statutory mechanism were in place to obviate potential third party
liability, there would be added incentive for persons to volunteer under Ohio's
plan. Such a statutory mechanism is in place in Missouri where volunteers are
protected from third party civil suits aimed at collecting "clean-up costs, response
costs or other legal or equitable damages, including costs of restitution." 134 This
extended liability protection includes tort immunity for any tort occurring as a
result of cleanup activities that are conducted within the ambit of the approved
remedial plan.135
Missouri law requires that there be a public hearing before any covenant not
to sue is granted by the department of natural resources. 136 This public hearing
stages and extensively throughout the voluntary remedial action. See generally COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 25-16-301-310 (1997); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.3-58.12 (West 1997); IND.
CODE §§ 13-25-5-1-23 (1996); 1996 MtcH. LEGIs. SERV. 380-381, 383-384; MINN. STAT.
§§ 115B.17-.20 (1996 & Supp. 1997); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 260.565-.575 (1994); TEX. HEALTH
& SAFm' CODEANN. §§ 361.601-.613 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998).
133 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.12(A) (West 1998). Volunteers, certified
professionals, state agencies, political subdivisions, and sundry others enjoy immunity from tort
liability under section 3746.24 of the Ohio Revised Code. See id § 3746.24(B)-(C).
134 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 447.714(3) (West Supp. 1998). The statute continues, "[s]uch
immunity shall not apply to the failure to remediate hazardous substances in accordance with
the voluntary remediation action site plan, statutes and regulations or the failure to operate the
facility in compliance with applicable federal, state and local environmental statutes, regulations
and ordinances." Id.
135 Id.; see also id § 447.712 (setting forth immunity for government agencies).
13 6 See id § 447.714(3)-(4). However, the goal of this public hearing is to "assess the
effectiveness of the remedy for the intended use of the eligible project." Id § 447.714(2), (4). In
Missouri, the covenant itself does not act to release the volunteer from liability. The statute acts
as the release while the covenant is just a mechanism that triggers the release.
As previously mentioned, the OEPA does not hold a public hearing before it grants a
covenant not to sue. The appropriate time for public input is during the drafting of the standard
rules.
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protects third parties in that they will become aware of the remediation and may
file a complaint before the covenant not to sue was issued, and the third party may
attempt to block the issuance of a covenant not to sue. However, once the
covenant is issued, volunteers enjoy the immunities from third party liability
listed above. If Ohio's legislature were to incorporate immunity from third party
liability into its VAP, public meetings would become a necessity in order to
protect third party interests.
c. Fundfor Recovery of Orphan Share Associated Costs
When Ohio created its VAP, it did not provide for the allocation of orphan
share liability. Orphan share liability is liability for remediation costs that are
allocated to responsible parties that are insolvent, unidentified, or cannot be
located.137
The fact that there is no provision in Ohio's VAP allocating orphan share
liability suggests that anyone volunteering to remediate a given property takes on
responsibility for all costs except what might be recovered through the VAP cost
recovery statute.138 In some instances, orphan share liability could discourage a
potential volunteer from participating in Ohio's program. Several states have
specifically addressed the question of how to ensure that orphan shares do not act
to discourage the volunteer.139
For example, California has a statutorily created state fund to absorb orphan
share liability so that the volunteer is not unduly burdened or discouraged by the
expense. 140 Of course, the California VAP operates quite differently from Ohio's
statute. In California, the department of environmental protection must approve
any remediation plan before it is put into action.141 When approving the plan, the
department of environmental protection is required to notify all responsible
persons, the affected community, and the public of the department's final
apportionment of liability. 142 At this time, the department must also indicate
whether there are orphan shares and whether or not funds will be available from
the trust fund to cover the orphan share liability.143 The department apportions
137 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25396(m) (West Supp. 1998).
138 The only fund created by Ohio's VAP was the VAP administration fund, which was
created for the director to expend on implementation, administration, and enforcement of the
VAP. See OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 3746.16 (West 1995).
139 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-281(10) (1997) (defining "orphan share" as situations
where identified, non-paying, responsible parties cease to exist, have entered into qualified
business settlements, have entered into a settlement for less than its allocated share, or the
director deems the share uncollectable).
14 0 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 2398.2(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1992).
141 See id. § 253982(e).
142 See id § 25398.8(a)(1).
143 See id. § 25398.8(a)(2); see also id § 25396.6(c)(2).
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liability after taking into consideration "equitable factors and fairness principles,
including orphan shares." 144 This apportionment of liability is not subject to
judicial review.145
Ohio's General Assembly should put into operation such a fund and a
mechanism for volunteers to access that fund thereby removing a great
disincentive to cleaning up Ohio's environment. Although the OEPA does not
"approve" remediation plans in the same sense as California does, or have any
role in allocating the liability of potentially responsible parties, the Ohio General
Assembly could enact a statute that would permit the OEPA to approve funds to
cover orphan share costs. Of course, the volunteer would have to produce a
remediation plan and information regarding potential apportionment before
undertaking any remediation. The enactment of such a provision, however, would
decrease both the orphan share costs being carried by the volunteer and the costs
in attempting to collect from each solvent potentially responsible party (PRP).
An additional problem regarding cost recovery under Ohio's VAP concerns
the strict statute of limitations on recovery from PRPs.
2. Statute ofLimitations
Ohio's VAP provides that a volunteer may not seek cost recovery from any
PRP after three years from the date that the no further action letter was submitted
to the director of environmental protection. 146 Such a strict statute of limitations
only acts to protect the elusive PRP. Granted, there is a social interest in ensuring
that individuals will not be exposed to liability indefinitely, but Ohio's limitation
on cost recovery will only discourage potential volunteers from participating in
cleanups where there will be difficulty identifying PRPs that may be liable for a
significant portion of the remediation costs.
A more liberal approach would likely have the effect of encouraging wider
participation in Ohio's VAP in situations such as the one described above. For
example, Massachusetts's statute of limitations for recovery of response costs
from PRPs is three years after (1) the date on which the plaintiff first discovers or
should have discovered that the defendant was liable, (2) the date the plaintiff
learns of a breach of an agreement worked out under Massachusetts's VAP
dispute resolution procedures, (3) the date on which the plaintiff completes a
response action, or (4) the date on which the plaintiff sends notice to the
defendant pursuant to Massachusetts's VAP statute.147 Ohio obviously could
benefit by inserting a more liberal statute of limitations provision, comparable to
Massachusetts's, in its VAP scheme. Such a provision should state that the statute
144 Id. § 25398.8(b).
14 5 See id § 25398.8(e).
146 See OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 3746.23(C) (West 1998).
14 7 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21E, § I1A(2) (1996).
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of limitations under Ohio's VAP would run three years from the date the no
further action letter was submitted to the director of environmental protection or
from the date on which the plaintiff first discovers or should have discovered that
the defendant was liable-whichever occurs later.
3. New Financial Incentives
Financial incentives will ultimately determine the success of any state's VAP.
Costs of any given cleanup are potentially high and, in order to convince
developers to stay away from pristine land, cleanup incentives must be available.
Currently, Ohio offers tax abatements, low-interest loans (if the remediation
involves the improvement of groundwater), and limited grants. 148 When
compared to other states' VAPs, Ohio's incentives are considered above average.
Indeed, many state VAPs do not yet even offer financial incentives to
volunteers. 149 Although Ohio's financial incentive package is well-developed, it
would benefit by granting discretionary control over the disbursement of financial
incentives to localities, adding a tax increment financing plan,150 adding grant
programs for private individuals and corporations, providing loans and loan
guarantees, and adding use sales and use tax exemptions for pollution control
equipment.
a. Tax Increment Financing, Tax Abatemen ts, and Localizing Control of
Incentives
Tax increment financing (TIF) is already available in many states.151 TIF
operates on the principle that future value stemming from brownfield
improvement can be used to finance current projects.152 Bonds are issued, and tax
revenue created from the increased value of brownfield properties is used to
redeem the bonds.1 53 Typically, enabling legislation by the state permits local
governmental bodies to create TIF authorities who establish a TIF policy for a
given region or zone.154
14 8 See supra notes 106-17 and accompanying text.
149 States without financial incentives are Arkansas, Colorado, Maine, Nebraska, New
York, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Washington. See BROWNFIELDS, supra note 10, at 303-04,
348-49,426,514,535,562,603,613,646.
150 While not addressing the issue of tax increment financing, George R. Farrah,
ENVIRONMENTAL TAX HANDBOOK (1993), is an invaluable source in evaluating tax
consequences of any given federal or state remediation.
151 See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 43, at 85; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 469.175 (1996 & Supp. 1997).
152 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.175(1) (1996 & Supp. 1997).
153 See id
154 See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 43, at 85-87.
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Amendments to the Ohio Revised Code, which involve a TIF plan would
necessarily give more authority to local govemmental bodies. Currently, any
volunteer that is granted a covenant not to sue receives a ten-year tax abatement
from the state, and a county or municipal government may enter into an
agreement for ten years whereby the volunteer may continue to receive up to a
100% tax abatement.155 Ohio's automatic tax abatement is unique among state
VAPs.156
Ohio's General Assembly should give the authority to grant tax abatements
or conduct a TIF plan to local governments. Some sites could be so attractive to
developers that they may be willing to develop them with little or no financial
incentives. Additional sites may only be remediated when tax abatements are
available. Other sites may be developed more effectively under a TIE plan.
Municipalities and county governments should be given complete discretion to
negotiate a financial incentive package with potential volunteers or create
standard plans that fit their communities' needs.
b. Other Financial Incentives
A system of grants would also encourage participation in Ohio's VAP.157 At
present, the Ohio remediator is left with few opportunities to obtain grants from
the state.158 Essentially, a grant system would perform the function of the orphan
share fund described above for volunteers who are not liable for any part of the
contamination. 159 Such grants could encourage small businesses to participate in
the VAP by reducing financially burdensome orphan liability, which small
businesses are usually unable to bear.
Further, Ohio's present system provides low-interest loans only for projects
that improve the quality of groundwater. 160 Many lenders are reluctant to loan
any funds to the brownfields remediator, so additional sources of loans are
necessary to encourage participation in the VAP. 161 The state should be the
lender. Of course, the state would be required to take on the risk of non-payment,
but the advantage would be the overall improvement of the state's natural
environment and potential encouragement for industry and business to move to
155 see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5709.87-.88(D) (West 1995).
15 6 Other states that use tax abatements as an incentive typically determine the value of the
abatement (e.g., how much tax is abated and for how long) on a case-by-case basis.
157 Some states only provide grants to municipalities. See, ag., PA. STAT. ANN. tit 35,
§ 6026.702(c) (West 1998). Other states provide grants to private individuals who are
remediating a site in cooperation with a municipal or county govemment See, e.g., Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 447.706(1) (West Supp. 1998).
15 8 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text
15 9 See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text
160 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
16 1 See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 43, at 82.
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Ohio. Several states have started revolving loan funds. Once the fund is initially
established its resources are replenished by borrower repayment. 162 Often these
funds are designed to assist target areas.163
The state should also provide loan guarantees to assure repayment to the
private lender. Although a loan guarantee program would not resolve liability
issues for lenders, it would provide assurance that the guaranteed portion would
be fully repaid.164 Loan guarantees are often seen as a viable alternative to loan
programs because less agency expertise in lending practices is required.' 65
Ohio should add sales and use tax refunds for equipment purchased in
connection with property remediation or for engineering control equipment
Nebraska has enacted a tax refund system such that any sales or use taxes paid for
any air or water pollution control facility are fully refundable. 166 Such an
incentive encourages volunteers to purchase pollution control equipment that they
may otherwise not be able to afford.
Although Ohio's incentives go well beyond the benefits supplied to
remediators in many other states, there is still room for improvement. More
localized control over available incentives coupled with state resources for grants,
loans, and guaranteed loans would be a better approach than the current
distribution of power regarding the allocation of tax abatements. 167
B. A More Effective VAP
1. Potential Conflict ofInterest Problems
One of the most unique features of Ohio's VAP is its element of
privatization. Volunteers deal with certified professionals instead of the OEPA.168
The OEPA's role is limited to auditing sites, reviewing no further action letters,
granting or denying covenants not to sue, and granting or denying variances.
Conflicts of interest are bound to arise because the certified professional
completely plans and guides the remediation process, yet is responsible to the
162 See id at 83. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 447.710 (West Supp. 1998) (establishing a
property reuse revolving fund that, in addition to direct loans, provides loan guarantees and
grants).
163 See BARTCH & COLLATON, supra note 43, at 83.
164 See id.
165 See id.
166 See NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-27, 150 (Supp. 1997) (tax refund subject to the approval of
the tax commissioner and department of environmental quality).
167 Many states have created "enterprise zones" or "industry zones" that are established by
municipal or county govemments. The zone authority often possesses wide power with regard
to the allocation of financial assistance. Most brownfield developers negotiate their own deal
with the authority. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 125.2654-.2657 (West 1997).
168 See supra notes 48-93 and accompanying text.
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OEPA to make sure that the volunteer meets Ohio's cleanup standards. Not only
is the certified professional responsible to the OEPA, but he or she is responsible
to the volunteer as well. In fact, nothing would stop a volunteer from firing a
certified professional whom the volunteer felt was creating undue difficulties and
making the VAP process too stringent. There are numerous provisions in the
Ohio Revised Code and the administrative rules governing the conduct of
certified professionals. The provisions are designed to discourage conflicts of
interest, but whether or not these provisions will be effective remains to be seen.
Ohio's General Assembly and the OEPA have gone to great lengths to
prevent outcomes in which a certified professional's judgment would be
compromised. 169 The VAP statute states that, "[a] certified professional shall
conscientiously avoid any conflict of interest with his employer or client"' 170 The
statute and administrative rules go even further, stating under what circumstances
a certified professional must reveal a financial interest or an interest in property to
be remediated to an employer' 7 ' and client. Further, the health and safety of the
public must always be the professional's highest obligation.' 72
Only five state programs have adopted VAPs that vest such authority in
persons outside the state environmental protection agency.173 The rest of the
states with VAPs have elected to keep the state environmental protection agency
in charge. Ohio's plan has the advantage of making remediation widely available
because the agency is not overwhelmed with requests to oversee remediation
projects. The risk for abuse, however, would seem greater when the regulatory
agency is cut out of the picture so completely. The only other option would
involve a complete overhaul of Ohio's VAP-an effort that surely will not be
undertaken unless the problem is sufficiently manifested and creates a situation
where the public's health and safety is no longer protected.' 74
169 See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.071(B)-(D) (West 1998) (describing
appropriate behavior for a certified professional); OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-05(F) (1996
& Supp. 1997) (describing cases in which a certified professional's license may be revoked).
170 OIO RnV. CODE ANN. § 3746.071(D)(1) (West 1998). Certified professionals who
violate these standards of conduct risk loss of their license. In addition, any covenants not to sue
based on that certified professional's no further action letter are subject to audit
171 See id § 3746.071(DX2); OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-05(F)(3)(b)--(c) (1996 &
Supp. 1997).
172 See OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 3746.071(B) (West 1998).
173 See Randall Edwards, Debate Goes on Over "Brownfield' Cleanup Program,
COLUMBUS DiSPATCH, Sept. 3, 1996, at Al.
174 Excessive instances of fraud by certified professionals or laboratories may lead to a
proposal for drastic change. The OEPA could react by revising the administrative rules to
require more audits or could push the legislature to vest authority in it to intervene earlier in the
remediation.
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2. Increasing Public Involvement
In addition to the difficulties Ohio's VAP may encounter with conflicts of
interest, there may also be problems with lack of public involvement As soon as
the OEPA announced its proposed rules under Ohio's VAP, the debate began
among environmentalists, industrial representatives, and the OEPA concerning
the adequacy of public involvement.175 A close look at the administrative rules
promulgated pursuant to Ohio's VAP indicates that environmentalists' concerns
may never have been adequately addressed.
The present statute and rules only require the director of environmental
protection to solicit comments from the public and hold a public hearing before a
variance is granted.176 Under Ohio's VAP, where there is no case-by-case review,
no public meeting is necessary before a covenant not to sue is granted. If a
volunteer has met the generic standards, then the covenant shall issue. Ohio's
General Assembly likely wanted to avoid the expense and time of engaging in
public hearings before the granting of a covenant not to sue.177 Anyone who
disputed cleanup standards had an opportunity to protest when the generic
standards were being considered by the OEPA. Although the structure of Ohio's
VAP may not lend itself to public involvement, one cannot assume that this is an
adequate state of affairs.
At the very least, the General Assembly should adopt an optional
"community relations plan."'178 The program would give volunteers an
opportunity, if they chose to take it, to communicate with the public about the
efficacy of their remediations and the purposes of the development. The level of
participation could also be left up to the discretion of those opting in and might
involve as little as flyers to neighbors or as much as a full-scale community
meeting where the developer, not the OEPA, could solicit comments 179 from the
public. Obviously, many developers have an interest in hearing the opinions of
17 5 See generally Randall Edwards, EPA Extends 'Brownftelds' Comment Period to Oct.
15, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 5, 1996, at C2; Edwards, supra note 173, at Al.
17 6 See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text; see also OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3746.09(C)-(E) (West 1998); OHIO ADMiN. CODE § 3745-300-12(H)-(K) (1996).
177 Over time the public may demand stricter generic standards than those found in the
current administrative rules. This would be an issue for the political process rather than an issue
regarding the general structure of the OEPA's rules regarding brownfields. However, it might
be advantageous for the OEPA to occasionally review the rules in a public forum and solicit
comments regarding any necessary changes.
178 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.7(h) (West 1997) (directing the Illinois department of
environmental protection to develop guidance for the implementation of an optional community
relations plan).
179 Such comments could be on a broad range of issues (e.g., proposed uses of the
property and requests for more stringent cleanup of a particular substance). The organization
cleaning up the site may use the opportunity to voluntarily notify the residents of the
neighborhood about the details of the cleanup.
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the members of the surrounding communities regarding their venture. Such a
meeting may serve to assuage public concern where public concern is not
justified. Further, public hearings would become a necessity in the event that
control of financial incentives became more localized or volunteers were granted
immunity from third party liability.
If financial incentives were to become more discretionary and authority to
grant or deny them was given to municipalities, counties, or the like, public
meetings would become necessary even before the remediation began.
180
Volunteers would want to establish early contact with the authority responsible
for creating their incentive package. It would become critical to "sell" the
community on the project and to point out the benefits of the remediation. The
community could then engage in a cost-benefit analysis, taking into account the
benefits of the remediation (e.g., jobs, future tax base, cleaner environment) and
the risks of encouraging the project (e.g., likelihood of failure of the industry,
small tax value for big nuisance value). Of course, if a volunteer had no interest in
obtaining a financial incentives package, no public meeting would be necessary,
but the volunteer would still be required to follow the generic guidelines set out in
the Ohio Revised Code.
Likewise, public meetings would become a necessity if a covenant not to sue
released the volunteer from liability to third parties. Third parties could not in
good faith be barred from suing the remediator for tort injuries arising from the
cleanup without the due process a public hearing would provide. In the 75% of
the volunteer remediation cases that the OEPA does not audit, these hearings
would become critical. The third party must be given the opportunity to challenge
whether or not the volunteer has complied with the generic standards.
IV. CONCLUSION
States are better suited to fixing their environmental woes than the federal
government. Each state legislature has unique knowledge of the needs of its own
community and is able to assess "what it's worth" to its particular state to
encourage remediation (e.g., what incentives is it willing to offer). Ohio's General
Assembly has taken the first step in cleaning up Ohio's brownfields problem by
promulgating its VAP.
Despite the fact that Ohio's VAP is a model statute, other states have chosen
to deviate from it in several significant ways. An analysis of these differences, as
vell as an analysis of the effect of these differences on participation, illuminates
the different manners in which Ohio's program can be improved. 18 1 For instance,
180 Recall that under the current VAP, municipalities have the discretionary authority to
grant up to a ten-year extension to the automatic tax abatement. Municipalities could begin
using this authority to encourage more community involvement by volunteers.
181 Statistical analysis of the effects of each states' VAP statutory elements on
participation would prove useful in making decisions about amending Ohio's VAP.
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Ohio's General Assembly should seriously consider adding liability protections
and a more liberal statute of limitations regarding cost recovery from PRPs. There
is also a wide variety of financial incentives being offered in other states that, if
adopted as part of Ohio's program, could act to increase volunteer participation.
In the end, the ultimate goal of Ohio's VAP is to encourage voluntary
participation in the remediation of sites that otherwise may remain as they are
indefinitely. A sense of partnership and cooperation between the Ohio General
Assembly, the OEPA, and participants is essential.
